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I. INTRODUCTION
While the economy continues to grow on a global scale, large
companies seeking to stay competitive must look to international markets as
a means of expansion and trade. As international mergers become a more
common means of accomplishing these goals, an increasing number of
countries are adopting competition laws. Unfortunately, the laws of
different countries and regions can, and do, come into conflict.
This paper examines the merger control laws of both the United States
and the European Union, why these laws sometimes conflict, and provides
suggestions for possible solutions for minimizing future conflicts. Part II
reviews the relevant merger laws of the United States and the European
Union. Part III looks at the conflicting nature of U.S. and E.U. standards of
review, while Part IV analyzes current and proposed solutions to merger
control conflicts.
II. APPLICABLE MERGER AND COMPETITION LAWS WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. United States
U.S. laws regarding competition and antitrust embody the substantial
lessening of competition standard of review. "The U.S. Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission routinely focus on potential
harm to consumers in evaluating a prospective merger."'  Antitrust and
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 2001, New York
University. The author would like to thank her family and friends for all of their love and
support, as well as the 2005-2006 JILB Editorial Board for their hard work and dedication
this year. The author remains responsible for all errors.
1 Martha Neil, Old Continent, New Deal, 90 A.B.A.J. 50, 54 (Sept. 2004).
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competition law in the United States began with the passing of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.2 Currently, however, merger
review is controlled by section 7 of the Clayton Act, "which directly
addresses mergers as a potential threat to competition., 3
1. Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act 4 was adopted as a government response to
the use of trusts and combinations to control competitive markets.5 Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal;
penalty") 6 focuses on mergers in restraint of tradeT-it has been said that it
"deals with means." 8  Section 1 forbids using contracts, combinations or
conspiracies that might monopolize trade, requiring some type of
"collaborative element."10  Section 1 creates two main categories of
prohibited transactions: those that are per se illegal and those that on the
surface do not appear to violate the Sherman Act. A transaction is per se
illegal when it "has no other purpose or effect than that of injuring,
suppressing or destroying competitive process."'12 When all other aspects of
a transaction do not appear to create a violation, the transaction must "have
the effect of substantially lessening competition or a tendency to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce" or be "accompanied with a specific
2 Lisa M. Renzi, The GE/Honeywell Merger: Catalyst in the Transnational
Conglomerate Merger Debate, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 109, 118 (2002).
3 id.
4 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004).
5 54 Am. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 46 (2004) [hereinafter AMJUR
Monopolies].
6 Section 1 states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1.
7 CONSTANCE K. ROBINSON & KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
304 (2004) [hereinafter PLI].
8 AMJUR Monopolies, supra note 5, § 4.
9Id.
'
0 1d. § 31.
11 1 LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES
§ 4:20 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter CALLMANN].
12 id.
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intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint."'1 3 Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp. stated that
[o]rdinarily, whether particular concerted conduct violates § 1 of the
Sherman Act is determined through case-by-case application of the so-
called rule of reason-that is, 'the fact finder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.'
14
The focus of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Monopolizing
trade a felony; penalty") 15 is on prohibiting mergers that monopolize a
market; 16 therefore, its focus is on the end result of a merger.1 7 Rather than
analyzing the form of a merger, section 2 looks at the results that could
occur if a merger proceeds. 18 Monopolization occurs when there exists both
intent to monopolize, as well as the ability to do so. 19 However, if there is
an actual monopoly, intent is not required.20 Since most cases have some
aspect of the transaction that falls under section 1, "there have been" few
cases "adjudicated on the basis of section 2 alone.' Section 2 prohibits
conspiracies to monopolize, which is distinct from the section 1 prohibition
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.22
By acting in concert, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act effectively
prohibit mergers that might monopolize a market. Even when a merger
does not contravene section 1, if monopolization could occur, it would
violate section 2.23 In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., the Supreme
Court stated "having by the first section forbidden all means of
13 Id. (quoting United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948)).
14 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (quoting Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
15 Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
16 PLI, supra note 7.
17 See AMJUR Monopolies, supra note 5, § 4.
18 id.
'" Id. § 60.
20 id.
21 CALLMANN, supra note 11, § 4.21.
22 Id.
23 AMJUR Monopolies, supra note 5, § 4.
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monopolizing trade ... the second section seeks, if possible, to make the
prohibitions of the Act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all
attempts to reach the end. 24
2. Clayton Act
While merger control in the United States began under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, since its passage in 1914, merger review has been governed
mainly by the Clayton Act. 5 Section 7 of the Clayton Act regulates
"[a]cquisition[s] by one corporation of stock of another" 26 and prohibits
any merger where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 27
Under the Clayton Act, the plaintiff in a merger review case does not
have to prove that the proposed merger actually affects competition.28 Any
time a merger is proposed, the Clayton Act
requires not merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger
upon competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive
conditions in the future; this is what is meant when it is said that the
amended section 7 was intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in
their 'incipiency.'
29
The "incipiency standard" that the Act imposes requires only that the
merger "may" cause some type of anti-competitive effect.30 The Clayton
Act's concern with potential anti-competitive effects is further highlighted
by the fact it goes so far as to allow government challenges to completed
mergers. 3
3. Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act 32 ("FTC Act") was originally
meant to add support to the Sherman and Clayton acts by "prohibit[ing]
only unfair methods of competition in commerce., 33  Attacking anti-
competitive practices both before they began and after they came into
24 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
25 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996).
26 id.
27 Id.
28 PLI, supra note 7, at 303.
29 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co. et al., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964) (quoting United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963)).
30 Id. at 304.
31 PLI, supra note 7.
32 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
33 AMJUR Monopolies, supra note 5, § 1152.
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existence, the FTC Act was meant to protect consumers, though in its
original inception the Act did this by protecting business competitors.34
4. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Hoping to "reduce the uncertainty associated with enforcement of the
antitrust laws in this area,, 35 on April 2, 1992, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") issued revisions to its 1982 Merger Guidelines, themselves a
revision of the 1968 Guidelines. 36 The DOJ strove to lay out the framework
and standards under which mergers were to be analyzed. 37  These
guidelines, which are applicable to both DOJ- and FTC-analyzed mergers,
marked the first time that the agencies issued joint guidelines3 8 for mergers
"subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act, to section 1 of the Sherman Act, or
to section 5 of the FTC Act.",39 The guidelines describe a five-step
analytical process to determine whether a merger would be anti-competitive
and disadvantage consumers. 40 "The elements include: market definition,
measurement and concentration; the potential adverse competitive effects of
the merger; entry; efficiencies; and failure and existing assets.'
5. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197642 ("Hart-
Scott-Rodino") was enacted to foreclose numerous loopholes in the U.S.
merger policies that incentivized "speedily and surreptitiousl'
consummating suspect mergers and then Protracting ensuing litigation.'
Actually section 7A of the Clayton Act,, Hart-Scott-Rodino provides "a
mechanism to provide advance notification to the antitrust authorities of
very large mergers prior to their consummation, and to improve procedures
to facilitate enjoining illegal mergers before they are consummated., 45
34 Id.
35 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 104, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/O.html [hereinafter Horizontal
Merger Guidelines].
36 CALLMANN, supra note 11, § 10.3 (quoting Statement Accompanying Revised Merger
Guidelines (April 8, 1997)).
37 Id.
38 CALLMANN, supra note 11, § 10:3.
39 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 35.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996).
43 W.J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 828 (1997).
44 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
45 S. Rep. No. 803, at 61 (1976) (discussing the reasons for passing Hart-Scott-
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Hart-Scott-Rodino's pre-merger notification requirements ensure that
almost all mergers are reported.46 For certain "very large mergers, 47 the
companies involved must first file notification with the DOJ and the FTC.48
Notification consists of filing a report form that describes the transaction,
indicates whether the companies are competitors (determined by the North
American Industrial Classification Code), and provides financial data,
planning documents and sales data.49  The companies must then wait,
usually thirty days, while the transaction is reviewed. 50 Either the DOJ or
the FTC can issue a Second ReqIuest, which would require the companies to
provide additional information. The DOJ or FTC can then approve or
reject the merger.
B. European Union
According to the merger controls in place in the European Union, the
single most important consideration is the effect a merger will have on
competition given the common market of the European Union. "The main
test of compatibility with the common market is the effect of the merger on
competition on the markets on which the merging businesses operate. 52
When E.U. regulators examine a merger under the European Commission's
Merger Regulation, their major area of focus is the effect that the merger
might have on competitors in the market.53 In large part, this may be due to
the fact that under E.U. law, once a merger has taken place, there is no legal
recourse (unlike in the United States, where the government can require that
a merger be reversed).
1. Articles 81 and 82 of the European Community Treaty
Despite the fact that both article 8154 and article 8255 of the European
Rodino) [hereinafter Senate Discussion].
46 Renzi, supra note 2, at 118.
47 Senate Discussion, supra note 45.




52 Europa, Merger Control Between Companies, Summary of Council Regulation
4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L395) 30 (EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/
126046.htm.
53 Neil, supra note 1.
54 Article 81 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and
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Community Treaty deal generally with competition law, and neither article
even mentions mergers, both have been held to apply to mergers. 56 In BAT
and Reynolds v. Commission, article 81 was held to limit mergers where a
competitor gained a minority share of another company in its market.57
Article 82 became applicable to mergers after Continental Can v.
Commission, which held that if a dominant company in a market acquired a
in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically
void.
3. The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 81, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
55 Article 82 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar
as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
EC Treaty art. 82.
56 Renzi, supra note 2, at n.29.
57 Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v. Comm'n, 1987 E.C.R. 4487, PP
37-39 & 64.
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competitor and the "degree of dominance reached substantially fetters
competition," the merger can be blocked.58  Despite the nationalist
tendencies of the Member States of the European Union, these articles have
become the major enforcement mechanism against cross-border anti-
competitive mergers.59
2. The European Commission's Merger Regulation
60
In effect since September 21, 1990, the European Commission's
Merger Regulation requires that the Commission review mergers that meet
two criteria: "(1) they must contain a 'concentration,' and (2) have a
'Community dimension' by meeting minimum financial thresholds." 6' A
concentration is "deemed to arise where: (a) two or more previously
independent undertakings merge, or (b) one or more persons controlling at
least one undertaking, or one or more undertakings acquire ... direct or
indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings., 62 The
scope of a merger analysis under the Council Regulation goes beyond
immediately foreseeable anti-competitive behaviors and into an analysis of
what may occur in the future.63
Beyond providing for advance notification and giving the Commission
the right to review a merger at the request of a member state, the E.U.
Merger Regulation applies to mergers that fall beyond the borders of the
European Union.64 Even if the effects of the merger are largely outside of
the European Union, the Commission is still granted merger review
capabilities under the Regulation.65
3. Commission Notice on the Appraisal of Horizontal Mergers
Issued by the Commission in 2004, the Commission Notice on the
Appraisal of Horizontal Mergers66 lays out a framework for analyzing
58 Case 6/72, Cont'l Can v. Comm'n, 1973 E.C.R. 215.
59 Id. at 113.
60 Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L395/1), corrigendum 1990 O.J. (LL257/14),
as amended by Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L180/1) [hereinafter Council
Regulation].
61 Renzi, supra note 2, at 114.
62 Council Regulation, supra note 60, at art. 3(1).
63 CALLMANN, supra note 11, § 28.12.
64 id.
65 Id.
66 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5 (providing
guidelines for the assessment of horizontal mergers pursuant to Council Regulation No.
139/2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_031 /
c03120040205en00050018.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter E.C. Merger
Guidelines].
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mergers. This analysis includes defining the product and geographic
markets that the merger would impact, as well as an assessment of the
impact on the competitiveness of the merger.67 The competitiveness
assessment follows a series of five steps: (1) whether the merger will likely
have any anticompetitive effects in the defined markets; 68 (2) whether the
power of the buyer is likely to become a force against increased market
power;69 (3) whether new firms will enter the market to maintain
competition; 0 (4) whether any efficiencies will be created; 71 and (5)
whether a failing firm defense could exist.
72
1II. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION: DIFFERING
APPROACHES TO MERGER REVIEW
A. Merger Control Standards of Review
When companies propose a merger, they must submit it for review to
the relevant authorities in any country where the criteria for merger review
are met. The substantive standards of review for each country are not
necessarily the same, which leads to a level of uncertainty as to whether the
proposed merger will be approved. These standards fall into three main
categories: (1) whether the merger would create or strengthen a dominant
position (the market dominance standard of review); (2) whether there is a
substantial lessening of competition; and (3) the effects on competition,
combined with other policy concerns.73
When it comes to competition and antitrust laws in the United States
and the European Union, as applied to mergers, these standards of review
can conflict. Due to the large number of transnational transactions, these
conflicts must be resolved to avoid failures and delays in trade.
1. Market Dominance Standard of Review
Under a market dominance standard of review, the merger is
considered in light of whether it would create or strengthen a dominant
position in the market. If a firm will attain such a position through the






72 E.C. Merger Guidelines, supra note 66, 89-91.
73 Andre Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in International Merger Control, 20 Nw. J. INI'L L.
& Bus. 233, 252 (2000).
74 J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review - Is it
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standard employed by the European Union Merger Regulation.75
2. Substantial Lessening of Competition Standard of Review
This standard of review, embodied in the United States' approach to
merger control,76 considers whether a proposed merger will either: (a)
narrow the field to a small number of companies, or (b) allow one firm to
have complete power over the market." If the proposed merger might
possibly lead to either of these results, competition in the field is considered
to be substantially lessened and the merger will be prohibited, barring
mitigating circumstances.
3. Public Interest Standard of Review
While first considering the effects on competition if the proposed
merger proceeds, this standard then considers the possible policy concerns
of the proposed merger, such as "employment, export promotion and
international comparative advantage. 78  This is the approach of the
domestic merger policies of countries such as the United Kingdom, France
and Spain.79
B. The Standards of Review in the United States and the European Union
In the United States, mergers are evaluated based upon a market
dominance standard of review. For at least the last twenty years, "increased
economic efficiency leading to an increase in consumer welfare" has been
the focus of U.S. antitrust policy. 80 In looking at market power, the United
States examines various factors in context, using a microeconomic
approach.81
The European Union, on the other hand, evaluates mergers under a
substantial les~enifig of competition standard of review. "[M]arket
integration, consumer welfare and creating a level-playing field for
competition" are important goals of E.U. competition law.82 Due to the fact
Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty?, POL'Y DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REV. 9,
12(1999).
7 Id. at n.9.
76 Id. at n.10.
7 Id. at 12.
78 Id.
791 Id. at n.11.
80 Krzysztof Kuik, Recent Developments in EU/US Trade Relations, 79 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 433, 442 (2002).
81 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report Chapter 2 (2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm [hereinafter Final Report].
82 Kuik, supra note 80.
480
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that there is no recourse after a merger has been completed, the long term
effects of allowing a merger are of greater importance.83 Dominance
determinations in the E.U. place a strong presumption on a high market
share, with "50 percent and sometimes 40 percent of a market mean[ing]
dominance, especially if the next largest company is far behind.,
84
C. Cases of Conflict
There have been instances of conflict regarding the approval of
proposed mergers. The two famous cases in this area arose from the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger and the GE/Honeywell merger. When
examining both Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell, one theory
of the disparity between the U.S. and E.U. outcomes is that "the differences
in the respective merger conclusions appear to derive from the relative
weight each regulatory body gave to consumers versus competitors. '" 85 One
reason behind this is the standard of review applied by each body.
1. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: A Case of Conflict and
Eventual Resolution
U.S. companies Boeing Company ("Boeing") and McDonnell Douglas
Corporation ("MDC") pursued merger beginning in 1997. Quickly
approved by the FTC, the merger was thought to enhance competition, as
well as to strengthen the U.S. defense industry.86 The FTC approved the
merger on the grounds that the merger would not substantially reduce
competition due to Boeing's already existing market domination.
Despite a lack of assets in the European Union or the existence of any
European subsidiaries, the European Commission determined that the
merger satisfied the financial threshold to establish a Community dimension
under the Merger Regulation, thereby granting the Commission jurisdiction
to review the merger.87 Instead of focusing on the defense aspects of the
merger, the Commission looked exclusively at the large commercial jet
aircraft industry market.
88
The Commission relied on Boeing's position within the worldwide
commercial jet market when taking the stance that the merger would
significantly enhance Boeing's lead in the worldwide market. 89 At the time
83 Id.
84 Final Report, supra note 81.
85 David F. Feeney, The European Commission's Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over




89 J.D. Banks, The Development of the Concept of Extraterritoriality Under European
Merger Law and its Effectiveness Under the Merger Regulation Following the
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the merger was proposed, Boeing had a 64% market share, Airbus Industrie
controlled 30% and MDC had 6%.90 The proposed combined company
would occupy 70% of the worldwide market, and, due to the numerous
market-entry barriers including the high amount of initial capital needed,
the Commission believed that the combined company would most likely
maintain that dominant market position.9  Given Boeing's exclusive
contracts with three of the four largest airlines, the addition of MDC's
resources would give the combined company further opportunities to
leverage MDC contracts into long term exclusive deals.92 In light of this
market structure and the increased leverage the combined company would
have over suppliers,93 the Commission determined that the merger would
harm competition and damage the European Common Market.94
The Commission's objections to the merger fell into three main
categories: exclusive supply contracts, expansion of market share, and
Boeing's access to public funds through defense contracts that might
potentially be used in commercial aircraft. 95 Boeing made numerous
concessions in an effort to appease the Commission and reduce the
possibility that the Commission would block the proposed merger. Due to
Boeing's willingness to make changes to its original proposal, the
Commission did not block the merger.
2. GE/Honeywell: The Merger That Wasn't
In 2000, U.S. company General Electric Company ("GE") proposed
the purchase of another U.S. company, Honeywell International, Inc.
("Honeywell"), planning to turn Honeywell into a wholly-owned subsidiary
of GE. 6 This merger would have been the largest industrial merger in
history.97 The DOJ approved the merger after requiring few changes.98
However, the Commission refused to allow the merger, making it the first
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Decision 1997, 19 EuR. COMPETITION L. REv. 306, 309 (1998).
90 Commission Decision 97/816, Case IV/M.877 - Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 1997
O.J. (L 336) 16, 20 7 29 (E).
9" Id. at 24 50.
92 Banks, supra note 89.
93 Commission Decision 97/816, supra note 90, at 20-21 TT 30-35, 28 72, 30-35 7
83-103.
94 Id. at 36 113.
95 Feeney, supra note 85, at 470.
96 Id. at 474.
97 Daniel Dombey & Andrew Hill, Monti Moves to Heal GE Rift: EU Competition
Commissioner Calls for More Co-operation With US After Honeywell Deal is Blocked, FIN.
TIMES, July 4, 2001, at 1.
98 Press Release, Dep't Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Requires Divestitures
in Merger between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2001/8140.pdf.
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time the Commission had ever denied "a merger request of two American
corporations that the U.S. antitrust authorities had approved." 99
In analyzing the merger, the DOJ "accepted the companies' argument
that the combination would result in a more efficient operation leading to
lower prices for consumers."100  There were two main issues the DOJ
encountered. First, the DOJ was concerned about the possibility of
increased costs for the U.S. military due to an anticipated decrease in the
development of engine models. To alleviate this risk, the DOI required that
Honeywell's military helicopter division be sold.' 0' Second, the DOJ found
that the contracts for Honeywell engine and auxiliary power unit
maintenance would decrease, leading to reduced competition. The DOJ
solved this problem by mandating the creation of an independent third-party
to provide the services required under these contracts.1
0 2
Despite the requirements imposed by the DOJ, the Commission still
believed the merger was potentially unfair to competition. Even though
both companies were American, the Commission ruled that it had
jurisdiction since the financial requirements were met, 0 3 and, as defined
under the Merger Regulation, 0 4 a concentration could exist. Despite the
numerous industries in which both companies operated, the Commission
focused its assessment on the aerospace and industrial systems markets.'0 5
Specifically, the Commission determined that the aerospace industry was
subject to anti-competitive effects due to the merger of GE's aircraft engine
manufacturing unit with Honeywell's avionic, non-avionic, and engine
starter manufacturing unit. 0 6 This could have led to both horizontal and
vertical effects on the industry.1
0 7
After analyzing the proposed merger and determining that the
surviving entity could have dominated several markets, the Commission
refused to permit the merger. In order to allow the merger to proceed, the
Commission would have required divestures above and beyond those
proposed by the DOJ. As a result, GE chose to forgo the merger.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR RESOLVING MERGER REVIEW
CONFLICTS
There are currently a number of treaties, organizations and ideas
99 Feeney, supra note 85, at 475.
100 Neil, supra note 1.
101 Press Release, Dep't Justice, Antitrust Div., supra note 98.
102 Id.
103 Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, July 3, 2001, P7.
14 Id. 6.
'o' Id. 567.
106 Id. 5, 567.
'o7 Id. 567.
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suggesting ways to bridge the differences between U.S. and E.U.
competition and antitrust laws.
A. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") was established on December 14, 1960 and is now comprised of
thirty countries, including the United States and much of Europe. 0 8 The
OECD considers itself "a forum in which governments work together to
address the economic, social and environmental challenges of
interdependence and globalization."' 0 9 Article 1 of the OECD Convention
states that its mission is "[t]o promote policies designed: ... to contribute to
growth in world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis." ' l0
The OECD is divided into the Council, which is comprised of the
member nations and the European Commission and is responsible for the
running of the OECD; the Secretariat, which analyzes specific issues and
creates proposals to address these topics; and the Committees, which work
with the Secretariat to discuss and implement proposals on specific
issues.' 1
The OECD is considered the most active of all the international
organizations that can affect competition policies. 12 In 1995, the OECD
issued the Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-
operation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices
Affecting International Trade." 3 The Recommendation seeks to increase
cooperation among member states in the area of antitrust enforcement. This
is meant to be accomplished by setting up a means of "notification,
exchange of information and co-ordination of action" among member states
so that all members are aware when their interests might be affected by the
antitrust policies of another member,' 14 as well as seeking to provide a
O0 OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD: OECD Member Countries,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1 1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Jan. 18, 2006).
109 OECD, The Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development PowerPoint
Presentation, slide 2, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/23/2397890.ppt (last visited Jan. 18,
2006).
"1o Id. at slide 5.
... Id. at slide 6.
112 P.J. LLOYD & KERRIN M. VAUTIER, PROMOTING COMPETITION IN GLOBAL MARKETS: A
MULTI-NATIONAL APPROACH 131 (1999).
113 OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between
Member Countries On Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade,
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mechanism for "Consultation and Conciliation."'" 5  Known both for
implementing binding agreements, as well as utilizing non-binding
instruments that clarify topics of disagreement," 6 the OECD has two arms
that might provide some resolution to the merger control conflicts-the
Competition Law and Policy Committee and the Global Forum on
Competition.
1. The Competition Law and Policy Committee
The Competition Law and Policy Committee ("CLP") of the OECD
has for decades been the leading forum for regular, focused, off-the-record
policy dialogue among the world's leading competition officials. 17 The
OECD's "Competition Committee, made up of the leaders of the world's
major competition authorities, is the premier source of policy analysis and
advice to governments on how best to harness market forces in the interests
of greater global economic efficiency and prosperity."" 8 This dialogue has
built mutual understanding and has had substantial real-world benefits, such
as means of conflict avoidance and cooperation that have been used
successfully by members and non-members alike. The CLP has also
identified voluntary "best practices" and created substantial analytical
convergence." 9  Some feel that the Committee can act as a bilateral
network to encourage cooperation "in the analysis of particular mergers of
common interest."' The CLP has held roundtable discussions, developed
framework papers, produced monographs, and sought to develop common
competition principles among its members. An example is the Working
Party on Cooperation ("WP3"). 12 1
The WP3 examines how reporting requirements for mergers can be
standardized. When issuing the "Framework for Premerger Notification
Forms," the WP3 determined areas in which countries were collecting
essentially similar information. It then suggested how countries could work
together to reduce the amount of duplicated effort. 22 Currently, the WP3 is
115 Id.
... OECD, Overview of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/
0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050 1 1 1 1,00.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
117 Terry Winslow, The OECD's Global Forum On Competition and Other Activities, 16
ANTITRUST 38 (2001).
118 OECD, Competition Law and Policy, http://www.oecd.org/department/
0,2688,en_2649_34685_1 111 ,00.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
119 OECD, Competition: OECD Global Forum on Competition, http://www.oecd.org/
document/60/0,2340,en2649_374632732220_1_1_137463,00.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2006).
120 Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and The Future Of
Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 457, 466 (2002).
121 Winslow, supra note 117.
122 Id.
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looking at multinational merger review and how those processes can be
streamlined and reformed. 1
23
2. The Global Forum on Competition
Representatives from more then fifty-five countries met on October
17, 2001 for the first meeting of the Global Forum on Competition. 124 "The
OECD Global Forum on Competition is one of eight 'Global Forums'
created to deepen and extend relations with a larger number of non-OECD
economies in fields where the OECD has particular expertise and global
dialogue is important."' 125 The Forum was designed to create an open
discussion among developed and developing countries regarding issues
related to competition and antitrust. 26  At the initial meeting, merger
enforcement was on the agenda. 27 In February of 2004, the Forum met for
the fourth time to discuss issues such as "Regulatory Reform: Stock-taking
of experience with reviews of competition law and policy in OECD
countries" and "Challenges/Obstacles faced by competition authorities in
achieving greater economic development through the promotion of
competition."'
28
B. The International Competition Network
The International Competition Network was founded in October 2001,
based on recommendations from the 2000 report of the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee ("ICPAC"). 129 Originally entitled
the Global Competition Network ("GCN"), the founding principle was that
the GCN could be used to foster agreement among nations regarding
competition and antitrust law. At the same time, corporations would be
better able to predict the success of a proposed merger before starting what
can be an expensive process. 13  This proposal was well-received by U.S.
authorities.13  By focusing on narrowly-defined issues, the GCN could
123 Id. at 39.
124 Jonathan Lechter et al., Antitrust Violations, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 225, 271 (2002).
125 OECD, Capacity Building: OECD Global Forum on Competition,
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,2340,en_2649_34535_2732220 1_1_1_l,00.html (last
visited Jan. 18, 2006).
126 Lechter, supra note 124.
127 Winslow, supra note 117, at 39.
128 OECD, Fourth Global Forum on Competition, February 12-13, 2004, Paris (France),
http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_34611_177312561 1_1 1,00.html.
129 ICN, History, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/history.html (ICPAC
was formed in 1997 by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust Joel Klein) (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
130 Renzi, supra note 2.
131 See Charles A. James, Asst. Att'y Gen., Dep't of J. Antitrust Div., Address Before the
OECD Global Forum on Competition: International Antitrust in the 21st Century:
486
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quickly answer needed questions. 132
Focusing "exclusively on the procedural and substantive issues
directly affecting multi-jurisdictional antitrust enforcement," 133 the GCN
would create a dialogue among nations to create standardized practices
applicable to adopting countries. 134  Unlike other international
organizations, the GCN strove to "be an inclusive, consensus-building
effort" 135 that worked towards a "specific convergence agenda" in regards
to domestic antitrust and competition laws. 136 Rather than work against the
OECD and the Global Forum, the GCN was designed to supplement the
work of those organizations. 
137
GCN, now named the International Competition Network ("ICN"), has
a mission to create "a project-oriented, consensus-based, informal network
of antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries that will
address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common interest and
formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence through a
results-oriented agenda and structure.' 38 The ICN has two main goals: (1)
support developing nations in the enforcement of their antitrust laws,
including increasing competition; and (2) promote the convergence of
antitrust laws among developed and developing nations. 3  This
environment was meant to create a more unified approach to antitrust
enforcement such that global antitrust policies would be more efficient and
effective. It was felt that such a system would eliminate "unnecessary or
duplicative procedural burdens" that would otherwise negatively affect
consumers and businesses. 1
40
Cooperation and Convergence, 7-11 (Oct. 17, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/9330.pdf
132 U.S. and EU Wrangle Over Enforcement at OECD's Global Forum on Competition,
81 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. n.2029, 347 (Oct. 19, 2001), available at
http://pubs.bna.com/IP/BNA/ATR.NSF/SearchAllView/F676CFD1 DE3FBE5E85256AE900
7A7114?Open&highlight-GCN.
133 James, supra note 131, at 9.
134 Douglas K. Schnell, All Bundled Up: Bringing the Failed GE/Honeywell Merger in
from the Cold, 37 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 217, 252 (2003).
135 Charles A. James, Asst. Att'y Gen., Dep't of J. Antitrust Div., Address Before the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 28th Annual Conference on International Law and Policy:
Reconciling Divergent Enforcement Policies: Where Do We Go From Here? (Oct. 25,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9395.pdf.
136 id.
137 James, supra note 131.
138 ICN, Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the International
Competition Network, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
mou.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
139 SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE BRYAN, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 8.6 (2003).
140 ICN, International Competition Network, available at
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The First Annual ICN Conference, held in September of 2002, adopted
the guiding principles of a merger review scheme. These eight principles
were: (1) sovereignty; (2) transparency; (3) non-discrimination on the basis
of nationality; (4) procedural fairness; (5) efficient, timely, and effective
review; (6) coordination; (7) convergence; and (8) protection of confidential
information. 141 The ICN also detailed "Recommended Practices for Merger
Notification Procedures," the categories of which were: (1) establishing a
nexus to the reviewing jurisdiction; (2) notification thresholds; and (3)
timing of notification. 142
In June 2003, the Second Annual ICN Conference adopted the
"Recommended Practices" proposed at the first ICN Conference. 43  In
addition, the Conference adopted other recommended practices that fell
under the categories of: (1) review periods; (2) requirements for initial
notification; (3) transparency; and (4) review of merger control
provisions. 144
The latest conference, the Third Annual ICN Conference, was held in
April of 2004. Additional recommended practices were adopted, including:
(1) conduct of merger investigations; (2) procedural fairness; (3)
confidentiality; and (4) inter-agency coordination.
C. Recommendations of the United States International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee
In 2000, the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to
the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
("Advisory Committee") issued a Final Report regarding the state of
international competition law. 146 In its examination of multi-jurisdictional
mergers, the Advisory Committee recommended that the "challenges may
best be addressed by facilitating, where possible, substantive harmonization
and convergence of substantive standards and approaches to merger
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
141 ICN, Guiding Principles For Merger Notification and Review, available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/icnnpworkinggroupguiding.pdf (last visited
Jan. 18, 2006).
142 ICN Merger Notification and Procedures Subgroup, Recommended Practices For
Merger Notification Procedures, available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/icn-npnew.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
143 Lorne & Bryan, supra note 139.
144 ICN, Recommended Practices For Merger Notification Procedures, available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mnprecpractices.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2006).
145 ICN Subgroup on Merger Notification and Procedures, Final Subgroup Draft,
available at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/seoul/mwg-nps-seoul.pdf (last
visited Jan. 18, 2005).
146 Final Report, supra note 81.
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review."'147 Steps towards achieving this goal were discussed.
Recognizing "that agreement on specific substantive rules is unlikely
in the foreseeable future" 148 the Advisory Committee instead outlined areas
where nations should begin working to harmonize and converge on issues
surrounding merger review. These are: (1) "understanding more clearly the
merger review principles currently employed by various jurisdictions"; (2)
"developing agreed-upon approaches of what the Advisory Committee is
calling 'disciplines' that nations would use to guide the review of mergers
with significant transnational or spillover effects"; and (3) "encourage
continued and deepened cooperation among antitrust authorities in
reviewing multijurisdictional mergers. 149  This last area suggested a
framework to "foster this mutually beneficial cooperation between
companies and competition authorities."' 5o
D. The Framework Directive
The Framework Directive was first proposed in Europe, though it has
not been adopted. This model requires that a group of nations agree to a
small number of directives that are adopted as a framework for addressing
market issues. One example would be a general mandate that there be "no
anticompetitive mergers with significant negative external effects, subject
to possible transparent and proportional derogation." 151 The approach is
flexible enough that the directives adopted can be general principles that the
participating jurisdictions would meet by formulating their own national
rules. I2
E. The "Amalgamated" Approach
Rather than expect any of the above forums or ideas to become the
primary focus of international merger review and policy, the forums could
work in conjunction to develop a viable merger review policy within the
framework directive. Charles James, then Assistant Attorney General of
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, made reference to
this cooperation between the CLP, ICN, and the OECD Forum on
Competition as early as 2001.153 There has also been mention that the ICN
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process.54 Possibilities exist for the sharing of work product, such as in the
area of merger reporting requirements, where the CLP has already produced
data and the ICN is interested in standardizing these requirements. 155 It is
even possible that the ICN's end product could be presented for review to
the OECD Global Forum on Competition. 56
F. Principles of Positive Comity
Protection of competition is becoming a major motivating factor in
competition policy for both the European Union and the United States,1
57
though it must be noted that the phrases "competition, competitive and
anticompetitive" might not have the same meaning in both jurisdictions and
their governing bodies. 15 8 As authorities begin to realize that competition
must be protected and to do so they must work together, bilateral
agreements employing the concept of positive comity have gained
support. 1
59
Positive comity requires that "when anticompetitive conduct that
adversely affects the important interests of one party occurs within the
borders of another party, the 'affected party' may request that the 'territorial
party' initiate appropriate enforcement actions.' 160 This structure attempts
to alleviate any conflicts that might arise over jurisdiction.' 6' In 1991, the
United States and the European Union signed a bilateral agreement
encompassing the principles of positive comity.1
62
While the principles of positive comity are not a part of merger control
regimes at this time, the lessons learned from their application in other areas
informs the discussion. Competition authorities have recognized, through
these principles, that it is often important to avoid conflict in sensitive areas
such as extraterritorial jurisdiction. By allowing other nations to conduct
154 Winslow, supra note 117, at 40.
155 id.
156 id.
157 Kuik, supra note 80.
158 Id.
159 Final Report, supra note 81, at ch. 5.
160 Id.
161 id.
162 Id.; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition
Laws, U.S.-EC, Sept. 23, 1991, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,504; 61
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 382-85 (Sept. 26, 1991); Council Decision 95/145,
1995 O.J. (L 95) 45 (EC), corrected, Corrigenda to Decision 95/145, 1995 O.J. (L 131) 38
(EC). After the European Court of Justice found that the Commission lacked the authority to
enact this Agreement, Case C-327/91, France v. Comm'n, (Aug. 9, 1994), 5 C.M.L.R. 517
(1994), the Commission entered into a nearly identical agreement in April 1995. 1995 O.J.
(L95) 45, corrected, 1995 O.J. (L131) 38.
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reviews regarding anticompetitive behavior that occurred within their
borders, these countries recognize that other authorities might be better able
to handle the issue. This idea could also be applied to the merger review
context. When companies seek to merge, especially in cases where both
companies are based in one country, great deference should be given to the
merger review authorities in that country.
In the GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas cases discussed
above, the European Union determined that the economic impact of the
proposed mergers was significant enough to affect the E.U. economy.
Greater weight should have been given to the findings of the DOJ and FTC
to avoid the delays and merger abandonment that eventually occurred. If
the principles underlying the idea of positive comity could have been
applied in these situations, with deference being given to the findings of the
merger's originating country, the issues witnessed might have been
avoided.
V. CONCLUSION: MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGERS IN THE
GLOBAL MARKET
In the end, as the economy grows on a global scale, consensus
regarding how to deal with multi-jurisdictional mergers must be reached.
Leaving merger review decisions in the hands of domestic organizations
and courts could produce a detrimental impact on large international
mergers, since "[n]ational authorities and courts consider only the benefits
and harms within their own borders; nations act nationalistically.,1 63 A
mutually agreed upon arrangement must be determined and enforced for the
benefit of the global economy.
While no country would ever concede all authority over its merger
review process to a supra-national organization, it is not inconceivable that
countries would consent to a more generalized organization with the power
to pass directives for countries to implement. Look only towards the
overall success of the European Union in regards to standardizing the laws
of its member nations. Within that framework, directives are passed and
each nation may implement such directives as they see it fit. For merger
review, this might be a promising start towards standardizing the process
and allowing more transparency for companies looking towards future
mergers.
Concerns could and should arise with regard to developing countries.
The membership of the current competition-focused bodies is comprised
mainly of developed or nearly-developed governments and economies.
What role would less developed countries, where the merger review process
might not be of utmost concern, play in the development of merger review
163 Fox, supra note 120, at 467.
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standards? This is not a question that is easily answered. The OECD
Forum on Competition did invite non-member countries to participate,
though many acknowledged that more non-member countries should have
been added. However, there were concerns "that increased numbers would
inhibit candid and interactive discussion."'
164
Additionally, most of the topics covered in the forums and by these
groups are part of the agenda set by the member states. Again, the
experiences of countries admitted to both the European Union and the
World Trade Organization after both had been in existence for a number of
years might be probative in this situation. Perhaps, based on the
experiences of those countries, a better framework for the inclusion of
developing countries in the standardization of a multi-jurisdictional merger
review process could be achieved.
In the end, as a global economy becomes the norm, we must look at
both national and international law in the context of how it affects the
international market. "Global markets demand globally-conceptualized
law."' 165 Only as national laws become standardized, especially in relation
to the control of markets, can we truly realize the power of a global
economy.
164 Winslow, supra note 117.
165 Id.
